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Review Essay 
Irrationability and Gianni Vattimo's TheEndofModemity 
James Sosnoski 
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 
Vattimo, Gianni. The End of Modernity. Trans. with an Introduction by Jon R. 
Snyder. Parallax: Re-visions of Culture and Society. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988. 
Gianni Vattimo has a fatal attraction to modernity. He has a passion for 
it. He calls us about it and neither we nor he can get off the phone-the 
conversation seems endless. Imagine two lovers quarreling. Finally, Jack says 
to Jill, "this is the end; I don't want to talk to you anymore!" Then, they go on 
talking. A friend might conjecture that Jackwanted to goon talking; that he did 
not want to end this relationship. Reading The End of Modernity, I come away 
feeling that Vattimo wishes to continue his affair with modernity. 
I take Vattimo's case as symptomatic. Like him, some postmodern critics 
invest heavily in anti-metaphysics. Perhaps philosophers should. That issue I 
will leave to philosophers and here address only the question of the value of 
Vattimo's The End of Modernity for a postmodern cultural criticism. My view 
is that this work goes in a direction troublesome for a cultural criticwho wishes 
to address the experiences of his or her constituency-persons uyingto survive 
a postmodern world. For me the experience of the end of modernity is the body 
crying out, forging its own rhetoric. It is an experience of pain seeking words. 
It is not a cognitive experience entailing the destructuration of the discourses 
of European philosophy since Plato. An anti-metaphysics is inescapably con- 
ceptual. Hence, it prolongs the death watch. There seems to be no end. The 
wake is indeed a wake. The mourners keep the mourned vital if not alive. By 
recalling over and over the life of the allegedly deceased, however critically, they 
revivify him in themselves. 
In these remarks, I take Gianni Vattimo's The End ofModernity as a point 
of departure for asking the question-can a postmodern praxis be derived 
from a modern logos? Specifically, what do Vattimo's terms contribute to 
understanding an experience as painful as the end of modernity, the end of a 
way of life? I have become increasingly convinced that dethroning metaphysics 
in its own terms is merely to celebrate at its wake, thus endlessly postponing the 
funeral. 
For instance,when Vattimo visited Miami University in the spring of 1990, 
my colleagues, responding to his book, raised questions in his own "anti" - 
metaphysical terms. On the one hand, this is a customary protocol. On the 1
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other, as investments in repairing its structure through restructuration, as 
negations of its concepts, as ways of recuperating its logos, thevery terms of the 
book preclude the end of modernity. I do not suggest that more telling 
questions could have been asked of him in some sort of meta -terminology. 
There is no such terminology. But often systematic uses of terms preclude 
questions from "outside" the system and thereby alternatives to it. Anti- 
metaphysics is metaphysics in reverse. You travel the same road when you turn 
about and go in the opposite direction. 
Ordinarily, in reading texts made from a specific fabric of beliefs, critics 
have a choice to make. They can empathetically "dwell within" the pattern as 
defined or "break out" of the spell of those boundaries.1 They does not have 
access tosome other language or system that offers a higher perspective; rather 
she has "faith" or "doubt." If readers have faith in a credo, then they make every 
effort to understand its terms and accept them on faith as insightful and 
heuristic. On the other hand, readers can doubt the value of the credo and 
distrust the insights its texts offer. They do not, thereby, assume a higher or 
better vantage point offered by an alternative system of beliefs. Their credo 
(like a television that's not cable-ready) becomes less efficacious and they start 
to desire an alternative. Beliefs wear out, become outdated, lack the where- 
withal to decode contemporary experiences. 
Credos are like intellectual software. They are useful at one historical 
moment and then give way to other programs. To go from one conceptual 
software to another requires an act of faith. There are reasons to do so. But it 
is not that WordPerfect 5.1 has a meta-critical relation to Wordstar 2.0. Only 
that which you can do with one, you can't do with the other. It may seem 
infelicitous or crude to speak about metaphysics as an outdated conceptual 
software, but it is hardly unusual to speak of concepts as tools, that is, as 
"wares" for our work. For me, it is a question of the work they can assist us 
in accomplishing. When persons use a given belief to govern their conduct, 
desires are either satisfied or unsatisfied. Essentialism is not a problem 
because it is a conceptual error, a flaw in our thought processes. As a way of 
thinking, it is outmoded. It doesn't do the job for the desires that invoked its 
resources. Essences are poor tools for a post-modern world. In a world 
governed by Rorschach tests ("when I hold up this image and say thisword, tell 
what you feel" says the ad exec to us like a spider to a fly), concepts blur 
experience. They are "infinitely interpretable." 
Vattimo's work seems at first glance to give us ways of coping with a 
post-modern world by exploring the inadequacies of modern conceptions of 
our experiences. The dilemma of the end of modernity is that the world has 
changed in a radical way that calls for a new way of "being in the world," he 
remonstrates. But the issue is whether we should or shouldn't change our 
conceptions of experience, and it is difficult to see how a discussion of the 
inadequacy of our conceptions of artistic and scientific understanding at the 
highest level of philosophical generality can incisively address problems of 2




conduct when they are so remote from it. You might ask, why narrow the 
problem of a rapidly changing world to the issue of conduct. Consider the 
changes that are taking place according to Vattimo-secularization, commer- 
cialization, reification, simulacrization (26). We live in a world that wages wars 
and elects presidents through electronic media campaigns. We live in a world 
dominated by access to electronic technologies. We live in an increasingly 
electronic environment. Consider our future. We live in a world that is 
ecologically unsound and which seems more and more likely to choke off our 
existence (pun intended). I claim that our survival does not depend upon 
concepts but upon the ability of intellectuals to motivate their constituencies to 
change the world by changing their conduct in it. My skepticism about thinkers 
like Vattimo is that their constituencies are only a tiny group of like-minded 
intellectuals who speak the same language. The problem with Vattimo's terms 
is that they are too metaphysical despite his disclaimers (not only outrageously 
abstract, arcane, involuted) to affect any other constituency than the readers 
of Western European philosophy. To continue to address the question of the 
end of modernity in the language of "anti-metaphysics" is to think at an 
historical standstill. Metaphysics concerns the most general level of thought 
possible: the concept of 'Being' is the exemplary instance of such generality. 
Discourse that attempts the highest possible level of generality is suitable to 
purposeful reductions of experience like mathematics or physics or cybernetics 
or even Artificial Intelligence. Such generalizations operate well with rules of 
logic to produce speculations about controlling experiences through a very 
limited number of its variables. One difficulty with metaphysics is that it 
attempts to use such formulations to explain the complexities of experience. 
Medieval theologians thought this enterprise was legitimate because God was, 
after all, pure idea and man was like him in spirit. 
What bothers me about Vattimo is that he still uses such formulations to 
address the complexities of experience as if those complexities could be 
controlled by limiting them to a small number of variables-e.g. the desire to 
interpret (find meaning). Such desires seem to me to permeate modern 
thought-e.g., Freud/sexuality. Modern thought seems governed by a struc- 
turalism that construes explanation as a dynamics-somewhere in the depth 
of the structure lies the cause and if we can generalize it, then we explain 
ourselves. This strategy of explanation I regard as essentialistic. 
Vattimo writes that "Being is nothing other than the transmission of the 
historicallgeschiclulich opening that constitutes for every historical being, je 
and je, the specific possibility of access to the world." What kind of an 
"opening," what kind of "access to the world"? Not access for me, not for my 
students, and not for the carpenter whose arrival interrupted my typing the 
previous sentence. And, if not for me and them, then there is no opening to 
anything that matters to us and most certainly not to a "world" I know mostly 
from my TV screen. 
In his chapter on "The Death or Decline of Art," and in parallel passages 3
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about poetry and science, Vattimo claims to be saying exactly the opposite of 
what I attribute to him. He writes, 
Like the whole of the heritage of metaphysics, the death of art cannot be 
understood as a `notion' which could be said to correspond (or fail to 
correspond) to a certain state of things, or which is more or less logically 
contradictory and could therefore be replaced by some other 'notion,' or 
whose origin, ideological significance, and so on could be explained. It is 
instead an event that constitutes the historical and ontological constella- 
tion in which we move. (52) 
But what is the "event" of the death of art? We learn from this essay that it 
is bound up with increasing aestheticization of our experiences-including the 
history of science (95)? But who participated in this event? This "event" is 
constituted only by Vattimo's description of it. Theorists describe the experi- 
ences of theorists. I have no doubt that it is possible to experience the end of 
modernity as "the infinite interpretability of reality," to experience the death 
of Art as its "inaugurability," to experience the philosophy of science as "the 
aestheticization of its history," but I cannot bring myself to believe that this 
experience pertains to my students. It may sound odd for me to say this because 
it seems almost palpable that students believe in the infinite interpretability of 
reality. But that's just it. They do-at the level of common sense, at the level 
of their concrete, material, everyday practices. But that is not the level at which 
Vattimo understands the experience. For him the experience is an experience 
of Being. It takes place in a completely different register of experience from 
everyday practices. For students, "the infinite interpretability of reality" is a 
guide to their conduct with friends and enemies. Theorists sometimes seem to 
assume the role of "organic" intellectuals for the human race. 
In his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions did Kuhn dissolve Kant's 
distinction among histories and "aestheticize" the history of science? 
"Aestheticize?" Perhaps, by analogy. Similarly, Vattimo accepts Heidegger's 
view that the "essence" of technology must be sought in something other than 
technology. Here metaphysics becomes poetry. The attempt to "overcome" 
metaphysics leads to an "illogical" "application" of it. We understand "es- 
sences" metaphorically. But what if I say this is awkward poetry? It does not 
engage my feelings. It is not resonant. It lacks suggestiveness. I am not 
persuaded that I should deal with the problems of technology poetically. And 
maybe that's because it's poetry about concepts rather than people. 
Who is to be included in the "we" who are concerned with "the shattering 
of the poetic word," its inaugurability? 
The meaning of the inaugurability of the work of art can be granted greater 
or lesser importance according towhether one thinks of poetry in the same 
way as one thinks of the Bible, the great national epics, or the ground- 4




breaking works of our civilization (the Greek tragedians, Dante, 
Shakespeare, HOlderlin, and so on), or whether one tries instead to test the 
definition even on 'minor' works of art-in which case this inaugurability 
might be understood above all as the originality or as the irreducibility of 
the work to whatever has already been" (67). 
Aside from wondering why Shakespeare is "groundbreaking" (and nowomen 
are) and even if I knewwhat ground was broken, making an experience into an 
abstract abstraction (inaugurability) is a trait of modernism. Postmodern 
persons (people who are alive) who retain this modern trait may have difficul- 
ties coping with their world. 
The End of Modernity is a provocative book. On the one hand, it confirms 
my sense that we are living in a postmodern era. On the other, I do not 
experience the "end of modernity" in quite the way it isproposed in this volume, 
nor in the way this book is addressed by my colleagues. As a work of 
philosophy, the book appropriately deals with "the end of modernity" as a 
concept. At the same time, given the conceptual link between "post-history" 
and "the end of modernity," this concept has to be understood as the 
interpretation of an experience, albeit an experience of a rather small group of 
people. It is at the level of self-experience that I find myself resisting Vattimo's 
analysis. The experience Vattimo presupposesis more of an intertextual linking 
of his thought with other postmodern thinkers (which also characterizes the 
manner in which it is addressed) than it is an account of an experience anyone 
is likely to have. One then wonders, since we are in "post-history," if the concept 
is relevant to anyone other than a reader of the thinkers it links? 
When Vattimo thinks about the end of modernity, he reflects on the 
meaning of a concept and its conceptual history. He wants to "see" the post- 
modern "as an experience of the end of history" (4). But, he perceives his 
conceptions-"the" post-modern as a "way of being aware" of post-history (4- 
5). He perceives Nietzsche; he perceives Heidegger, he perceives Gehlen's 
post-history-"the condition in which progress becomes routine" (7). He sees 
this as a "speaking together" in which an awareness that the new is no longer 
perceived as the new is mentioned. This experience is one of not "feeling oneself 
as a moment that has been conditioned and sustained by a unitary process of 
events"-"an experience that is possible only for modern man" (10). Rather, 
the post-modern experience is feeling that "everything tends to flatten out at 
the level of contemporaneity and simultaneity" (10). Oddly, he applauds the 
"valid" founding of such "observations" on "empirical data" (12) because he 
does not wish to reduce such experiences to "'subjective' emotions and 
feelings" (12). This is a thinker thinking about how people might feel if they re-ad 
what he read. 
For Vattimo, the experience of the end of modernity is the experience 
after which nihilism as a mode of thought beyond metaphysics is "our only 
chance" (20). 5
Sosnoski: "Irrationability" and <em>The End of Modernity</em> by Gianni Vat
Published by New Prairie Press
310 STCL, Vol 14 No. 2 (Summer, 1992) 
Verwindung, which we experience as the sole possible form of post- 
metaphysical thought, is not only a matter of thought: rather, it concerns 
Being as such. This is another clear implication of the thought of both 
Nietzsche and Heidegger: nihilism is not only an 'error' of the mind but a 
destiny of Being itself. (179) 
But what is the experience "after which" nihilism becomes a way of thinking? 
This [Verwindung I may appear to be a very abstract generalization, but it 
is no longer so if we translate Verwindung into a term which is much more 
familiar to historians of Western civilization, namely the term 'seculariza- 
tion.' (179) 
Vattimo's delineation gives us the surface of the experience of secularization 
or commercialization in the sense that it takes the experience to be an entirely 
conscious one. The experience of postmoderniry hinges upon an experience of 
"the infinite interpretability of reality"-"the endless labour of interpretation 
of every aspect of existence" (rd), upon "profound revision and transforma- 
tion" (179) of our notions. He claims it is "a new experience" which is not 
catastrophic. Indeed not. An experience of the infinite interpretabilityof reality 
is, in many respects, the opposite of a crisis. Interpretations are marketable 
(though not in all cases profitable). A "historical" crisis is a crisis only to the 
extent that it is threatening. The loss of ultimate values (Gods, Truths, 
Beauties) threatens the self. Infinite interpretability does not. Moreover, 
interpretations, much less explanations, are not, experientially, infinite; they are 
as finite as the persons who interpret or explain. 
The question "why" is so disconcerting because it can be asked over and 
over again. Finally, as Wittgenstein observed, one runs out of answers. This 
seems to me to be the crucial moment, a moment that can only be reached by 
trying to answer the question "why." This moment of "having no answers," of 
having been driven to exasperated silence, reveals commitment. When parents 
reach this crux as a consequence of the innocent persistence of their children's 
questions and say, "Because I said so," they reveal themselves in their self- 
interest. This moment reveals interests. It is a moment in which one experiences 
the absence of reasons and the appearance of one's irrationality. It produces 
unreasonable responses. To ward off the moment, persons sometimes offer 
rationalizations that seem to forestall the advent of having none. Using the 
language of anti-metaphysics to offer an ironic counter-thesis to Vattimo's, I 
can say that my experience of the end of modernity is one of "irrationability," 
of having run short of reasons. The end of modernity, for me, is an experience 
of a crisis in belief. I can no longer believe what I once crucially did. I no longer 
have faith in what I thought grounded my thinking. There are no grounds for 
history or for progress. 6




The crisis of irrationability reveals you to yourself. You find yourself saying 
things like "because I say so." But the crisis does not always end in self-interest. 
Sometimes, it ends with remarks like "because I care," especially when the 
question "why" has to do with interpersonal relations. In this case, the crisis 
reveals pain. Pain for the pain of another. Persons have been known to do quite 
unreasonable things out of care. But caring in Vattimo, as in Heidegger, is 
metaphysical. 
Vattimo characteristically writes ". . the true substance of the crisis of 
humanism is the death of God" (32). In these remarks he treats experience as 
an inference from a concept that is true. This is a top/down form of thinking, 
a deduction, that allows him to generalize historically. But, his best claim to our 
attention is to configure our experience. If we experience "the crisis of 
humanism" analogously as "the death of God," then we accept Vattimo'sview 
of "the end of modernity." Persuasion is, as he himself points out, necessary. 
Yet, though he calls for persuasion, his rhetoric concerns the overcoming of 
metaphysics, the overcoming of a particular mode of intellection. Curiously, in 
this overcoming, the older term reassert s itself, for instance, in the expres- 
sion "true substance." Anti-metaphysics is called rhetoric but remains meta- 
physics. As anti-metaphysician, Vattimo, now understands his past to be a time 
when he was an unacknowledged (by himself) rhetorician and the present as a 
time when he acknowledges his "true" vocation. Nonetheless, his sentences do 
not change. Metacommentary is added to the older remarks like a new wing to 
an old cathedral. He still looks for the "true substance" of the crisis of 
humanism. What would happen if the sentence simply read "the crisis of 
humanism follows from the death of God"? Or, perhaps, the experience of no 
longer having any reasons follows from an inability to believe in God. Better yet 
(clearer), for those who no longer believe in God, there are no ultimate reasons. 
The rhetoric of Vattimo's sentence, "the true substance of the crisis of 
humanism is the death of God," obfuscates (is less clear to a potential audience 
than it might be). But, Vattimo's implied reader prefers his sentence in all its 
allusiveness. It is a readership that wishes to couch interpretations of their 
experience in philosophic terms. For an un-implied reader like myself, it is as 
though in Vattimo extraordinary labor is required to arrive at the position 
many people who do not read philosophy take for granted. For most people, 
not having any reasons because they no longer believe in God is not a crisis. 
In my experience (the only one I can vouch for), having no ultimate reason 
is less a crisis than running out of reasons. That God does not exist to provide 
me with an ultimate reason for Being is not experienced by me as a crisis. I 
experience crises at points at which I no longer have reasons because I ran out 
of them. I am left helpless. I do not know what to do next because I do not have 
a reason to do any one thing. Nonetheless I often act despite this and often 
passionately, not knowing why. Or, I don't act and "things" happen to me. I was 
recently ill. It appeared to be quite serious. Innumerable tests were given to me 
by many doctors. They did not know why I was ill. This was a crisis for me. Then 7
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I got better. They did not know why but I did. This was less a crisis for me. I no 
longer needed a reason. That there was no explanation no longer mattered. Am 
Ito infer from Vattimo's work that what happened to me was a crisis because 
I can no longer believe in God? Or, that there is no ultimate reason (God) to 
explain what happened? In one sense, I can say "of course." But only because 
of my past-having grown up as a Catholic who was taught to believe in God. 
But, at present, I do not need an ultimate reason-any reason will do. It's the 
fact that I can run out of reasons and still have to act that disturbs me. Or, more 
accurately, that I can have no reasons and still be motivated to act. Or, better 
still, that I can have reasons and act otherwise, that reasons are not what they 
used to be. 
Nor is it simply that I can be irrational. It is rather that what I do is no longer 
either a sin or a virtue (the latter disturbs me most). Sins and virtues are states 
in which there are reasons for my irrationality. More importantly, reasons for 
the irrationality of those whowish to harm me by manipulating me through my 
own culture to smoke, eat, drink, and drive myself to death. Now it becomes 
difficult to interpret others. Why do they do what they do? I can't count on any 
explanation. Reasons have little force. It is my ability to behave irrationally that 
disturbs me because it makes me like those who wish to harm me. I am not 
similarly bothered that there is no god for me to be like in spirit. If there is 
nothing to understand, why do I write? Why bother? But I want to understand 
even when I can only hope that I will. This is my irrationability at work. Here 
overcoming ( Venvindung) comes into play. If I can accept this about myself- 
that I want what I fear I cannot have, then I can deal with the need to act as if 
I could. This seems to me to be the critical moment: being able to act 
imaginatively. The better world I seek is imaginary, but nonetheless I can 
address this impossibility. In addressing this impossibility, I act caringly. 
I could act uncaringly. I can let affairs become what they will. But, if I do 
so, can I also accept that others may follow suit. Worse, that they are ahead of 
me--that they have been acting without reasons for some time. I cannot trust 
them. I have run out of reasons for trusting them. This feeling reaches crisis 
proportions. 
Quoting Nietzsche no longer suffices. 
Note 
1. I borrow this distinction from Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge: 
Towards a Post-Critkal Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958), p. 195ff. His terms are "dwelling in" and "breaking out." 8
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